

Yonatan Zunger · האוצותון What does Al Safety & Security Mean?

The history of CS is a history of rapid innovation.



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We tried to split up our profession

A few "serious" bits







The "exciting" stuff







And overall, we succeeded...



Sorta.

KIM ZETTER

SECURITY NOV 20, 2008 6:09 AM

Dead Teen's Mother Testifies about Daughter's Vulnerability in MySpace Suicide Case -- Update

LOS ANGELES — Two months before she committed suicide in 2006, a 13-year-old girl at the center of a landmark cyberbullying case was the happiest her parents had seen her in a long time. Tina Meier, testifying in a U.S. District Court in Los Angeles on Wednesday afternoon, described to jurors how her daughter Megan [...]

LOCAL CRIME & PUBLIC SAFETY

D.C. 911 center under fire again after baby dies during computer outage

It is unclear whether delays in delivering advanced medical care contributed to the five-month-old's death.



All of engineering has two sides:

Product Engineering:
How the system should work

Safety Engineering: How the system should fail





Most engineering disciplines don't treat these as separate. Neither should we.

So today ---

- I'll show you the three basic principles of safety engineering
- I'll give a concrete example of what an AI component failure looks like
- And then we'll walk through a full example of how to apply this to a real system.



First Principle of Safety Engineering

You are building systems, not software.

Everything is in scope.

"Your system" means the entire business process, including the people.

"Failures" means anything that might require your response.

Why? Because failures and fixes usually span component boundaries.

Why? Because if the human makes a mistake, the headline will still be about your AI system.

Why? Because engineers build systems to solve problems, and if any part of the system fails, you didn't solve the problem.

"User Error" is not an excuse.

- If it's one-off and catastrophic, how was it so easy to make that mistake?
- If it's routine, what aspect of the system was leading to it?
- Why wasn't the system robust to it?

The human is a component of your system and the system must be robust to component failure.

Every system is a sociotechnical system.

Second Principle of Safety Engineering

Know what can go wrong in your system, and for each of those things, have a plan.

- "Know what can go wrong" means a multi-pronged analysis: system-first, attacker-first, target-first.
- With failure, what you don't know can hurt you so get many eyes on it.
- "A plan" can mean anything from a system change, to an incident response plan, to better comms.
- "Unknown unknowns" are one of the things that can go wrong.

Third Principle of Safety Engineering

You start thinking about this the day you get the idea for the project, and you do it continuously until the day it's shut down.


Planning for failure isn't an exercise; it's the parallel to feature design.


You update your vision for the features all the time.

Update your vision of the failures just as often.

Use this by building a safety plan

- List the things that can go wrong; group similar failures.
- Look at the "failure chain" for each of them and find points of intervention.
- Look for common points of intervention to fix multiple issues.
- Write your plan: Failures, solutions, and a matrix to make sure each failure is covered.





Error is inherent to Al.

Generative Al's can err in five basic ways:

- Hallucination
- Omission
- Misinterpreting data
- GIGO
- Unexpected preferences

You can trade off compute for error rate, but you can never eliminate it.



So what do we do about it?


Instead of "hallucination," think "overreliance."

Humans err, too. Problems happen when you rely on them inappropriately.

Don't think of AI like "the computer" knowing the right answer; **Instead** think of it like a new hire straight out of school.


Good at: Brainstorming, summarizing, tasks that you can verify.

Bad at: Deterministically processing data.



Imagine an app to help bank loan officers.

• It gathers all the requisite data, summarizes it, and then a human makes the decision.



[Cue hysterical laughter]

What could possibly go wrong?

Data

Analysis

Presentation

Decision

Is it correct?

Is it complete?

Is it current?

Is it adversarial?

Is it what we think it is?

Misinterpreted Data

False positives (hallucinations)?

False negatives (omissions)?

Unexpected preferences

Does the human get the right info? Is it clear?

Decision errors Recordkeeping gaps

Analysis Presentation Data Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? False negatives (omissions)? Is it complete? Unexpected preferences Is it current? Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? Does the human No, it isn't. But this is get the right info? an existing issue not Is it clear? aggravated by Al. Mitigate it with robust data-gathering and a good revision

flow.

Decision errors
Recordkeeping gaps

Revision

Decision

Analysis Presentation Data Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? Is it complete? False negatives (omissions)? Unexpected preferences Is it current? Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? Does the human No, it isn't. But this is get the right info? an existing issue not Is it clear? aggravated by Al.

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Decision

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The presentation issues will apply here, too.

Analysis Presentation Data Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? False negatives (omissions)? Is it complete? Unexpected preferences Is it current? Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? No, it isn't. But this is an existing issue not Is it clear? aggravated by Al.

Mitigate it with robust data-gathering and a good revision flow.

Decision

Revision

Decision errors
Recordkeeping gaps

What does the user need to know?

- What changed?
- What factors set the original decision?

The presentation issues will apply here, too.

And test very hard for

this!

Presentation Analysis Decision Data Revision Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? Decision errors Is it complete? False negatives (omissions)? Recordkeeping gaps Unexpected preferences Is it current? Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? Does the human Harden against XPIA: get the right info? Treat all external data Is it clear? as hostile until proven safe.

Presentation Analysis Decision Data Revision Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? Decision errors Is it complete? False negatives (omissions)? Recordkeeping gaps Unexpected preferences Is it current? Is it adversarial? Does the human Think about each datum get the right info? Is it clear? we want and compare it to what we have.

Where do they differ?

Presentation Analysis Decision Data Revision Is it correct? Decision errors Is it complete? Recordkeeping gaps Is it current? Unexpected preferences Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? Does the human Can harden the code some, get the right info? but it's not 100%. Is it clear? Surface data sourcing in the UI, so if anything is unsourced or doesn't match the source, it's obvious to the user.

Presentation Analysis Decision Data Revision Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? Decision errors False negatives (omissions)? Is it complete? Recordkeeping gaps Is it current? Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? Does the human get the right info? This one is going to be hard to Is it clear? manage because it's subtle.

Expect to log, monitor, and do

a lot of experiments to resolve

over time.

Presentation Revision Analysis Decision Data Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? False negatives (omissions)? Is it complete? Is it current? Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? Does the human get the right info? This one is going to be hard to Is it clear? manage because it's subtle.

Presentation Analysis Decision Data Revision Is it correct? False positives (hallucinations)? Decision errors False negatives (omissions)? Recordkeeping gaps Is it complete? Unexpected preferences Is it current? Is it adversarial? Is it what we think it is? Thou Shalt Not Skimp on Thy UX Design

Is it correct?
Is it complete?
Is it current?
Is it adversarial?
Is it what we think it is?

Data Analysis Presentation

False positives (hallucinations)?
False negatives (omissions)?
Unexpected preferences

Does the human
get the right info?

Is it clear?

Decision

Revision

Decition errors
Recordkeeping gaps

Oh wait, you were trusting humans? You poor fool.

Better cross-check.


Some percent goes to multiple humans in parallel.

Putting it all together, here's our safety plan:

- Adversarial input → Harden inputs against XPIA and test
- Incorrect, incomplete, stale, misinterpreted input → Good data collection, revision flow
- Analysis error → Presentation UX needs to make sourcing clear
- Unexpected preference and misinterpretation → Monitor to check for patterns indicating bias based on both loan officer and applicant; continuous research
- Human error → Clear presentation UX; log all decision factors; multiple humans cross-check a sample and priority items
- The revision flow → Show what factors affected the previous decision and what's changed

So how do we do safety?

- Design the business process, not just the software system
- Know what can go wrong, and have a plan for it
- Do this continuously
- Test and monitor, especially in nondeterministic systems
- Apply similar strategies to human and AI component failures
- Build a safety plan and write it down




Safety includes everything.

There ain't no such thing as "out of scope."

Just because someone used a system in a way we didn't expect doesn't mean it's not our problem.

If it's your system and someone or something can get hurt, you need a plan.





Every engineer, every product manager, every designer.

Do it right, and your teams will follow. Do it wrong, and your teams will follow.